EtherNet/IP is a TCP/IP-based industrial protocol commonly used in industrial control systems (ICS). TCP/IP connectivity to the outside world has enabled ICS operators to implement more agile practices, but it also has exposed these cyber-physical systems to cyber a acks. Using a custom Scapy-based fuzzer to test for implementation aws in the EtherNet/IP so ware of commercial programmable logic controllers (PLC), we uncover a previously unreported denialof-service (DoS) vulnerability in the Ethernet/IP implementation of the Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1100 PLC that, if exploited, can cause the PLC to fault. ICS-CERT recently announces this vulnerability in the security advisory ICSA-17-138-03. is paper describes this vulnerability, the development of an EtherNet/IP fuzzer, and an approach to remotely monitor for faults generated when fuzzing.
INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems are vital components to the operation and functioning of Operational Technology (OT) systems used to manage critical infrastructure services. ere are sixteen critical infrastructure sectors de ned by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and most, if not all, utilize some form of ICS to manage and operate their assets [6] . OT systems are protected by varying levels of boundary defense, but o en have exploitable network interiors. To identify cyber threats against the control network segment inside an OT system, vulnerabilities in the ICS protocols must be analyzed.
To serve the need for greater e ciency and automation, modern industrial network protocols have evolved from serial-based eldbus protocols to TCP/IP-based protocols that are transported over standard Ethernet links.
e Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) [26] and Ethernet/Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP) [27] are two well-known Open DeviceNet Vendors Association (ODVA) TCP/IPbased industrial protocols used by a large number of industrial automation vendors. Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley (RA/AB) PLCs (e.g., ControlLogix and MicroLogix) implement these protocols. Herein, unless explicitly speci ed, the term EtherNet/IP refers to both of these related protocols, collectively.
Fuzz testing, or fuzzing, is a penetration testing technique to verify the robustness of target so ware in handling invalid, malformed, or unexpected input data. Fuzzing the implementations of control network protocols is an important step towards developing more secure industrial control systems. Voyiatzis et al. argue that control networks are rich targets for this type of black-box testing because those systems are likely to have been developed years ago, the source code and speci cation may not be available, a variety of vendor-speci c implementations may exist, and Internet connectivity is increasingly integrated with such systems [36] .
Li le information has been made publicly available on the vulnerabilities of the EtherNet/IP so ware used in commercial PLCs. To examine the robustness of the EtherNet/IP implemenation of select RA/AB devices, we create a fuzz testing tool (ENIP Fuzz) using Scapy, a Python module used for packet parsing and cra ing [1]. Scapy's exibility to send, sni , dissect and forge network packets has made it a popular tool among penetration testers.
Using ENIP Fuzz, we discover a previously unreported vulnerability in the EtherNet/IP implementation of the Rockwell Automation MicroLogix 1100 PLC that, if exploited, can cause the MicroLogix PLC to become unresponsive.
e ICS-CERT security advisory ICSA-17-138-03 [3] identi es several critical infrastructure sectors that are potentially vulnerable to this network denial-of-service a ack, i.e., Critical Manufacturing, Food and Agriculture, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems.
In summary, this paper describes the following contributions:
(1) A Scapy-based fuzzer for exploiting EtherNet/IP security vulnerabilities. (2) A remote fault detection strategy employing a liveness check, unexpected responses, and performance measurement to monitor the remote device during testing. (3) A discovery of a de ciency in MicroLogix's handling of the Programmable Controller Communication Commands (PCCC) protocol [14] , which is transported inside CIP messages. PCCC is a vendor-speci c CIP extension, used for communications with legacy RA/AB PLCs. By sending a specially cra ed PCCC command, a remote, unauthenticated a acker can trigger an unrecoverable error condition, requiring the PLC to undergo a hard reset. (4) A preliminary exploration of potential cross-generational vulnerabilities in di erent families of RA/AB PLCs.
In the remaining sections, we provide basic information on EtherNet/IP protocols and review prior work in §2. We then describe ENIP Fuzz and our remote monitoring approach in §3. A discussion of the fault detection results, the MicroLogix vulnerability, and the ControlLogix experimentation is in §4. We conclude in §5.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
is section provides an overview of the three protocols relevant to this work and summarizes previous work in ICS fuzz testing.
EtherNet/IP Protocols
CIP. Being an object-oriented protocol, each node in a CIP network is modeled as a set of objects [26] . An object is an abstract representation of a particular component within a product. A class is a set of objects of the same kind of system component. An object instance is the actual representation of a particular object. An instance of a class or an object share the same a ributes, but has its own unique a ribute values [26] . For example, the Identity object identi es the device, and its Status a ribute (a ribute ID = 0x05) describes the current state of the entire device [26] . A CIP node can have multiple object instances within a class of objects. A group of objects used in a device is referred to as that device's object model [26] . e CIP object library supports network communications, network services, and automation functions used by industrial components such as analog and digital input/output devices.
EtherNet/IP.
is protocol is an adaption of CIP to allow CIP communications to be transported over standard Ethernet. e EtherNet/IP standard de nes port 44818 as the designated port over which EtherNet/IP devices accept TCP and UDP connections. EtherNet/IP supports two primary types of communications: implicit and explicit [27] .
Implicit messaging enables a sending device (i.e., the producer) to exchange scheduled, time-critical control data to one or more receiving devices (i.e., the consumers) [27] . With implicit messaging, a CIP connection must be established [27] . Communication sessions related to a speci c connection are assigned a unique connection identi er upon establishing a connection [27] .
e CIP connection identi er acts as a dedicated communication path allowing multiple end-points to share data without the need to send the data multiple times [27] . Implicit messaging uses UDP and can be unicast or multicast [27] .
Explicit messaging provides general request/reply communication between two devices and is used for non-real-time data. For EtherNet/IP, explicit messaging uses TCP and does not require establishing a CIP connection [27] .
PCCC.
is protocol provides legacy support for older RA/AB PLCs, e.g., PLC5 and SLC500 [17] . When used with EtherNet/IP, the PCCC object (class code = 0x67) processes PCCC messages encapsulated in CIP payloads. is encapsulation is accomplished through the use of the "Execute PCCC" CIP service (service code = 0x4B). Each PCCC message contains a command code and a function code, which together specify the PCCC command to be executed by the receiving device. For example, the command code 0x06 and the function code 0x00 indicate the echo command whereas the command code 0x0F and the function code 0xA2 specify the protected typed logical read with three address elds command.
Fuzzing Methodologies
While there is no universally-accepted taxonomy of fuzzing approaches, most of the literature places fuzzers into one of two categories: mutation-based and generation-based. Mutation-based fuzzers apply transformations (mutations) on existing data samples to create test cases [30] . Generation-based fuzzers create test cases from behavior models of the system under test (SUT). Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses.
Mutation-based Fuzzers. Mutation-based fuzzers modify valid inputs by altering bytes to create fuzzed inputs [30] . Some mutation fuzzers utilize a description of the input elds, while other mutation fuzzers do not require any knowledge of the format; instead, they use heuristics to guess eld structure and mutate each eld [30] . Most mutation fuzzers extract data from recorded sessions for mutation, although some fuzzers intercept and mutate live tra c [30] . Mutation-based fuzzing is considered a form of brute force testing in that the fuzzer starts with valid inputs and incrementally transforms every bit within the input [33] . is requires li le up-front research and implementing a naive mutation-based is relatively straightforward. e SUT may employ complex logic infrequently invoked. Many fuzzing iterations may be required to achieve su cient code coverage, though this challenge can be o set with automation.
Generation-based Fuzzers. Generation-based fuzzers construct test cases employing rules de ning a grammar-based speci cation for inputs. e simplest fuzzers of this type create input data of random strings of bytes [30] . Some generation-based fuzzers must be con gured using an input description or data model to generate test cases [33] . e generation-based approach requires up-front research to understand the speci cation or source code of the target. However, rather than using hard-coded test cases, a generationbased fuzzer uses grammar-based rules to dynamically pinpoint the portions of the le or packet that represent fuzzable variables.
ICS Protocol Fuzzers
We survey relevant fuzzers and fuzzing frameworks, highlighting, when applicable, those ICS protocols each supports (Table 1) . We classify the surveyed so ware as either a custom fuzzer or a fuzzing framework. Custom, or one-o , fuzzers target a speci c le format or network protocol. ey can be used to stress test a wide range of applications that support the target format or protocol.
Su on [33] descibes fuzzing frameworks as homogenous development environments that enable the use of reusable utilities to maximize extensiblity. Sulley and Peach are examples of opensource, generation-based fuzzing frameworks that support some ICS protocols [30] . Sulley is a framework consisting of multiple commercially licensed blackPeer [19] framework several, including Modbus NA Codenomicon's Defensics [7] framework several, including CIP, EtherNet/IP, Modbus, OPC UA Server, Pro net, Scada GOOSE commercially licensed ICCP Fuzzer [22] custom ICCP NA LZFuzz [18] framework several, including SNMP [30] NA MTF [36] custom Modbus NA OPC-MFuzzer [37] custom OPC, DCOM, RPC [29] NA OPC Server Fuzzer [24] custom OPC Server NA Peach [9] framework several, including Modbus, BACNet, DNP3, OPC [9, 37] open-source ProFuzz [23] custom Pro net open-source scada-tools [34, 35] custom Pro net open-source Sulley [28] framework several, including Modbus, DNP3, TPKT, COPT [20] open-source Wuldtech's Achilles [4] custom several, including EtherNet/IP, Foundation Fieldbus, MMS, Modbus, OPC UA, Pro net, DNP3, MMS, SES-92 commercially licensed extensible components, including an instrument to monitor the health status of the target and detect, track, and categorize what sequence of test cases triggers faults [33] . Sulley can also fuzz in parallel, increasing performance [33] . While some commercial fuzzers report supporting EtherNetIP in some fashion ([7] , [4] ), no other surveyed fuzzers support EtherNet/IP at all. Smith and Francia [31] report on an EtherNet/IP and CIP fuzzer, but the code is not available.
e Modbus/TCP Fuzzer (MTF) and scada-tools are two custom Scapy-based fuzzers for Modbus and Pro net, respectively [34, 36] . At DEFCON 15, Devarajan describes using the Sulley framework to fuzz Modbus, DNP3 and ICCP [20] . Similarly, Peach is designed for exiblity. It provides custom fuzzing strategies and data modi ers, as well as special processes called Agents for fault detection [9] .
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In general, fuzzers operate under two basic assumptions: (i) faults contained in a target application can be triggered through input controlled by the user and (ii) the execution of a faulty portion of an application will result in some behavioral manifestation (e.g., bricking the device or producing unexpected output) [12] . Most systems are designed to work with speci c inputs but, ideally, should be robust enough to gracefully handle malformed data. erefore, aws found from fuzzing will correspond to a bug in the target (e.g., le, network protocol, embedded device, and so ware).
Implementation of Support Library
We implement ENIP Fuzz, a custom fuzzer for testing security vulnerabilities in the EtherNet/IP and CIP layers of an EtherNet/IP implementation. ENIP Fuzz implements its own EtherNet/IP support library using Scapy, a Python module used for packet cra ing and manipulation [1] . Our library conforms to the EtherNet/IP speci cations [26, 27] [25] . ENIP Fuzz is complete in its support of the EtherNet/IP specication [27] and approximately one fourth of the CIP speci cation [26] . To characterize the EtherNet/IP tra c space we collect several samples of communication from our ICS lab environment, which included the AB/RA MicroLogix 1100 and ControlLogix 5570 devices. We implement all EtherNet/IP and CIP services captured in these tra c samples and add support for PCCC [25] .
Implementation of Fuzzer
Based on observed tra c in our lab, three types of EtherNet/IP service requests were chosen as test cases to fuzz: EtherNet/IP Register Session, CIP NOP, and Execute PCCC Service. For each type, elds are selected as primitives to fuzz based on the observed volatility in the eld's value. Fields that remained static a er having been assigned a constant value (e.g., a eld used for identifying an established EtherNet/IP session) are not fuzzed. Additionally, fuzzing is performed only at the layer in which the service request is encapsulated.
EtherNet/IP Register Session Request.
e EtherNet/IP Register Session request is used for establishing a TCP encapsulation session between an originator and a target. As de ned by the specciation [27, §2-4.4] , the originator shall open a TCP/IP connection to the target on port 0xAF12; the originator shall then send an EtherNet/IP Register Session request to the target. Upon receiving a valid Register Session request, the target shall assign and reply with a unique session identi er called the Session Handle, an unsigned 32-bit integer value [27] .
To fuzz the EtherNet/IP Register Session request, we manipulate the Protocol Version and Options Flags, rst in isolation and then simultaneously. Both elds take the value of an unsigned 16-bit integer. For each test case, ENIP Fuzz is programmed to fuzz these elds with a random integer from 0 to 65535. Per the EtherNet/IP speci cation [27, §2-4.4] and experimentation, with the exception of Session Handle, these are the only non-constant elds.
CIP NOP Request.
e CIP NOP (No Operation) request is a CIP common service that causes the receiver to generate a No Operation response [26, §A-4.17 ]. e receiver does not execute any other internal action; if the receiver does not support the CIP NOP, a response with a status error is returned [26, §A-4.17] . e CIP NOP request is chosen because of its simplicity. e CIP NOP request has no speci ed data eld structure and is only embedded in an EtherNet/IP Send RR Data Packet.
Without any associated data eld, the Class and Instance elds within the Request Path are the only fuzzable variables for CIP NOP. ey are fuzzed individually and then at the same time. Class and Instance are a type of CIP segment used for referencing a speci c CIP entity [26] . Segments are grouped together in order to de ne a relationship among di erent objects. e Request Path is a value used to specify such a relationship.
Execute PCCC Service. PCCC is a vendor-speci c applicationlayer protocol used for communication between certain RA/AB processors [25] . Unlike the EtherNet/IP Register Session and CIP NOP, the Execute PCCC Service is not a common service. According to its speci cation, PCCC is used primarily to "ease communication between legacy networks and the new CIP networks" [14, p. 7.17] . EtherNet/IP products are able to support PCCC through encapsulation within CIP. In our lab, we observe that the RSLogix 500 so ware, used to program ladder logic for RA/AB PLCs, periodically sends Execute PCCC Service commands to the PLC. e high regularity with which RSLogix sends the Execute PCCC Service command is the motivating factor in its selection for fuzzing.
e Protected Typed Logical Read with ree Address Fields command is the speci c Execute PCCC Service function chosen for fuzzing. is function is used to read data from a logical address [14, p. 7.17] . To fuzz this function the following elds are manipulated in isolation and then in combination: Byte Size, File Number, File Type, and Element Number.
Fault Monitoring
ough fuzzers may di er in their fuzzing techniques, fault monitoring is of particular importance. At its most basic level, a fuzzer might detect that a fault was triggered if the target crashes or becomes bricked, i.e., application is rendered unusable or is unable to accept a new connection [33] . More sophisticated fault detection may be achieved with the help of a debugger. For example, the Peach and Sulley fuzzing frameworks communicate directly with a debugger a ached to the target application [9, 33] . Su on et al. propose an alternative, where a debugger runs on the target platform to monitor exceptions and correlate fuzzing behavior with observed faults [33] .
ere are three ways the fuzzer remotely monitors for faults generated when fuzzing: a liveness check, unexpected responses, and performance degradation.
Many existing fuzzing approaches a ach a debugger to the SUT to determine when crashes occur. For example, Basnight uses an available JTAG interface for debugging the RA/AB ControlLogix L61 CPU [13] . Debugging with JTAG requires special pins called test access ports which may not be available in all devices. Other studies have leveraged built-in fault monitoring utilities. Dunlap describes using a task monitor utility available in the ControlLogix L61 to access timing data from ladder logic execution times for an anomalybased intrusion detection system [21] . A aching a debugger or performance monitor is not an option for our experiments, so we adopt alternative, remote-fault monitoring methods.
Since explicit interaces for fault detection are not always available, people have used remote analysis to determine when crashes have occured. Shapiro et al. describe using a liveness check to identify when an ICS device revives itself during a fuzzing session [30] .
eir study suggests that for protocols running over TCP, the occurrence of a TCP RST ag is a su cient metric for indicating that a target device has crashed; however they concede that this method may produce false positives. Similarly, Voyiatzis et al. argue that direct access to the SUT is not needed, simply a network connection to it [36] . ey suggest that through network behavior-such as socket timeout, reset, or close; failure in reopening a closed socket; and failure in opening a new socket-are useful indications that the SUT has crashed. ENIP Fuzz utilizes such indicators to judge if the target has crashed.
ENIP Fuzz also lters for unexpected responses. Voyiatzis et al. record information during fuzzing the Modbus protocol to check if responses are outside of the speci cation [36] . Similarly, ENIP Fuzz inspects response packet data for responses that do not conform to the speci cation.
In addition, we consider performance degradation as fault for real-time systems that may be elicited during fuzz testing. To the best of our knowledge, no other study has considered performance as a type of fault for detection during fuzzing. e NIST Guide to Supervisory Control and Data (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems Security highlights that ICSs are generally time critical; where delay of information cannot be tolerated [32] .
us, malformed packets impacting the timely delivery of responses may be considered a type of so failure, causing the SUT to go outside normal behavior. One of the contributions of our study is in exploring three potential performance metrics during fuzzing (discussed further in Section 4.3) to ascertain their reasonableness as candidates for detecting these types of so failures.
Generally, for monitoring performance when fuzzing, we record a baseline of valid tra c for each generator and compare this to tra c captured during fuzzing. ese baselines serve as a control, modeling how the device should behave under normal operation (e.g., valid EtherNet/IP requests). Records captured during fuzzing are compared to the baseline and analyzed for irregularities in response times. Any anomalous behavior is correlated with fuzz scenario, using timestamps and packet inspection.
Test Environment
Our test environment consists of four components: the SUT, the fuzzer, background tra c generators, and the monitor (Fig 1) . e test equipment for the experiments consists of an Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1100 PLC, a Windows 7 Virtual Machine (VM) with RSLinx, a Kali 2.0 VM with the fuzzer, a Kali 2.0 VM with the Ping utility, and a workstation with Mac OS X running Wireshark. e equipment are connected via Ethernet to a common hub. e SUT employed in this study is the MicroLogix 1100 PLC. e MicroLogix 1100 is an EtherNet/IP I/O scanner device that supports explicit messaging. Experimental tra c sent to the SUT is generated by a Kali 2.0 host running ENIP Fuzz. e background tra c generators are two hosts: Kali 2.0 running Ping and Kali 2.0 running RSLinx.
e Ping utility is used to send ICMP Echo requests at one second intervals. RSLinx is so ware for Allen-Bradley devices used to browse and con gure PLC devices. To generate requests, RSLinx is set to "autobrowse" mode, causing it to send UDP broadcast EtherNet/IP List Identity Response requests to the SUT (and, in fact all devices connected to the network). e monitor is Mac OS X host running Wireshark to collect all tra c for analysis.
Figure 1: Fuzzing test environment
During experimentation, a liveness check is performed using the Ping utility to determine that the target is still responsive. For performance degradation, we monitor the latency in responses to both ICMP Echo requests and EtherNet/IP requests made by the RSLinx. Irregularities in recorded response times may suggest increased CPU utilization or memory exhaustion related to fuzz testing. e SUT is also monitored for unexpected responses, i.e., responses outside the EtherNet/IP speci cation or otherwise incorrect (e.g., responses that contain erroneous data).
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We use three metrics for analysis: the deltas between ICMP Echo requests from Ping, List Identity requests from RSLinx, and the response from the service request being fuzzed. e SUT interacts with the tra c generators for about 5 minutes during a "warm-up period, " a er which the fuzzer sends either correctly formed packets (during baseline) or malformed packets (during testing) for a period of approximately 20 minutes. e Wireshark packet capture of the fuzzing session is then truncated into a 10 minute window, a er which each of the metrics is analyzed. Each delta is calculated by taking the di erence between the timestamp of the response and the request.
We perform three baseline measurements and fourteen trials (Table 2) . Each baseline and trial is repeated twice making the total number of tests twenty-eight. 
Response Time Analysis
Our results suggest that using the deltas in response times from ICMP Echo requests and List Identity requests may not be meaningful metrics for determining whether fuzzing has an observable e ect on the performance of the SUT. Using Tukey's Honest Signi cant Di erence (HSD) test there is no signi cant di erence in response times when fuzzing compared to when sending non-malformed tra c. Fig 2 and Fig 3 illustrate Tukey's HSD graphs for the fuzzing metric with the EtherNet/IP Register Session and CIP NOP commands, respectively. In this example, we see that all populations appear to overlap, therefore the null hypothesis (that the samples represent the same distribution, i.e., the latencies are una ected) cannot be rejected. On the other hand, under Tukey's HSD for tests against the Execute PCCC Service command, we observe some sensitivity with Fig 4) . Tukey's HSD suggests performance may be impacted during analysis, however the results are inconsistent. For example, when comparing pccc-exec-fuzz-leno-1 and pccc-exec-fuzz-le-no-2 we expect the mean latencies to overlap based on tests performed on EtherNet/IP Register Session and CIP NOP test cases, but instead we observe a statistical di erence between these populations. We observe similar anomalous results when comparing pccc-exec-fuzz-byte-1 with pccc-exec-fuzzbyte-2. Since there is high variability in the tra c contents across fuzzing sessions, the fact that we may see variable behavior across sessions is not unexpected; but more testing is warranted before it is possible to claim fuzzed inputs were responsible for any apparent performance degradation. 
Denial-of-Service Fault
When fuzzing the Execute PCCC Service, we discover a previously unreported DoS vulnerability caused by accessing certain Data Files with an invalid File Type. is result is not represented in the deltas discussed previously; we identify the types of packets that cause the fault and bypass it to produce the results in Fig 4. By sending a specially cra ed Execute PCCC Service packet to the SUT, a Major Error (0x08) is triggered and the device becomes unresponsive. To clear the fault, the device must be power-cycled and reset using the RSLogix Clear Major Fault utility.
e SUT used to test the fault condition is a MicroLogix 1100 PLC (1763-L16BWA Series B, FRN 14) .
According to the MicroLogix 1100 reference manual, data les store status and data information associated with instructions used in ladder subroutines [15, p. 40-41 ]. An existing CVE (CVE-2012-4690) describes a DoS fault that can occur when a malformed CIP packet is wri en to the Status le [2]. It is not clear if these two faults are related. Allen-Bradley has issued rmware releases for the MicroLogix 1100 to mitigate that vulnerability; the anomaly identi ed in CVE-2012-4690 was corrected in FRN 13 according to the release notes for FRN 14: "Status le bits […] were writable through communication messages which allowed the possibility to force the controller to go into fault. e solution included in this rmware revision allows users to CLEAR these bits […] but does NOT allow them to SET using Communication Messages" [16, p. 5] . Moreover, the observed fault is generated by a read request, i.e., eliciting our fault does not involve any write requests. To exploit the vulnerability, the a acker sends a single Execute PCCC Service -Protected Typed Logical Read with ree Address Fields packet with a File Number of 0x02-0x08 and File Type 0x48 or 0x47. Any combination of File Number 0x02-0x08 and File Type 0x48 or 0x47 will trigger a Major Error (0x08). Figures 6 and 7 illustrate example packets that will cause the fault.
In addition, to reproduce the fault, it appears that the a acker must establish a session with the target with an EtherNet/IP Register Session Request and then create a connection instance with a Connection Manager Forward Open Request.
e DoS packet needs not to immediately follow the Connection Manager Forward Open Request to cause the fault.
ControlLogix Experiment
We speculate that the same PCCC vulnerability could potentially exist in newer RA/AB PLC models because legacy code tends to be le in newer so ware without being fully tested. However, We observe that MicroLogix only returns the STS byte (0x10 = "Illegal command or format") whereas ControlLogix returns both STS and EXT STS bytes-STS = 0xF0 ("Error code in the EXT STS byte") and EXT STS = 0x06 ("Address doesn't point to something usable") [14] . is functional di erence indicates that it may be more valuable to ngerprint PLCs using information at the applicationlevel protocol headers, rather than more generic techniques using just port numbers.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we describe ENIP Fuzz, a fuzzing tool developed to uncover vulnerabilities in the EtherNet/IP so ware used in commercial PLCs. ENIP Fuzz can dissect Ethernet/IP packets with encapsulated CIP and PCCC messages. We use two di erent RA/AB PLCs, i.e., MicroLogix 1100 and ControlLogix 5570 as the SUT for our fuzzer.
While stress testing the MicroLogix 1100 PLC's handling of PCCC messages, we discover a aw in its implementation of the Execute PCCC Service request. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability by sending a single, specially-cra ed PCCC packet could cause the PLC to enter a faulted state that must be power-cycled and reset using a special recovery tool. is improper input validation vulnerability has been con rmed by the vendor and documented in the ICS-CERT security advisory ICSA-17-138-03. As reported by the advisory, the a ack a ects all existing models of the MicroLogix 1100 family. Testing beyond this family, we repeat the same fuzz testing on the ControlLogix 5570 and observe no failure.
Another contribution is the use of response times as a metric for remote fault detection. For the data we collect, statistical hypothesis testing via Tukey's HSD suggests we observed no signi cant di erence between the response times during normal activity and during fuzz testing; however, we encourage the community to consider metrics like these and consider performance degradation as a fault condition for real-time systems. Developing more nuanced remote fault-detection metrics for fuzz testing (rather than the current crash/no-crash metrics) seems well-intentioned but non-trivial.
Future Work
As an extension to this work, the EtherNet/IP support library can be expanded so that it is fully compliant with the EtherNet/IP speci cations. Be er handling of proprietary protocols such as PCCC should also be added; currently, these protocols are not supported by Wireshark's dissectors, and thus must be validated through alternative means, such as manual inspection of tra c (or, in our case, custom tools like ENIP Fuzz). We plan to integrate ENIP Fuzz into the Metasploit framework, either as a new module or an extension to an existing module.
We had initially considered those protocol layers targeted by existing fuzzing tools as out-of-scope of our work; however, testing the TCP and IP layers of the network stack may expose vulnerabilities in the ENIP/IP implementation, as the speci cation makes certain assumptions about the underlying TCP/IP mechanisms.
We consider the investigation of related aws across productsi.e., derived from speci cation ambiguities or from the irregularities of handling reserved or rare legacy protocols-to be potentially very interesting. Such shared aws have been observed in many other products, but no comprehensive study exists for families of ICS devices. us, it may be fruitful to further explore EtherNet/IP implementations across related products, i.e., products that conforms to the ODVA speci cation or deemed interoperable with related models. In particular, OpENer is a POSIX-compliant implementation of an EtherNet/IP protocol stack [8] . e development of this stack is partially supported by Rockwell Automation [11] . Given its portability, OpENer would be quite amenable to testing using existing frameworks and black-box fuzzers.
